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LORD BROUGHAM'S BROMIDE:
GOOD LAWYERS AS BAD CITIZENS
Gerald F. Uelmen*
Shortly after Johnnie Cochran's spell-binding final summation
in the case of People v. Simpson,' nationally syndicated columnist
George Will wrote that Cochran was a "good lawyer" but a "bad
citizen.",2 In context, he was reflecting upon Cochran's argument
that Detective Mark Fuhrman should be disbelieved because of his
virulent racist attitudes. He was asserting that the argument would
stir up racial resentments and set back race relations in the United
States, as well as diminish respect for the police.
Will's criticism called to mind the criticism heaped upon an-
other great advocate more than a century ago. Henry Lord
Brougham was representing Queen Caroline of England in pro-
ceedings before Parliament.3 King George IV, who had just suc-
ceeded to the Crown, was seeking to divorce his wife, Queen
Caroline, on grounds of her adultery.4 Parliament was considering
a special bill that would deprive the Queen of her title.5 At that
time English law permitted a "right of recrimination" as a defense
to a divorce action.6 If Lord Brougham could show that the King
himself had engaged in adulterous affairs, grounds for a divorce
would disappear. It was certainly the British "trial of the century"
for 1820. Lord Brougham not only had substantial evidence of the
King's affairs with numerous women, he could also show that,
while Prince of Wales, George had secretly married one of his mis-
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor Uelmen
was co-counsel for the defense in the case of People v. Simpson. His account of the
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1. No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1995).
2. George F. Will, Circus of the Century, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at A25.
3. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188 (1973).
4. Id.
5. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the
Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951,
960 n.27 (1991).
6. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 3, at 188.
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tresses, a Roman Catholic widow named Maria Fitzherbert . At
that time marriage to a Catholic meant forfeiture of the Crown for
a British sovereign. 8 By invoking the right of recrimination for his
client, Lord Brougham provoked a constitutional crisis of the
greatest magnitude. His advocacy on behalf of his client threat-
ened to bring the reign of King George IV to an ignominious end
before the king had even been crowned.9 Many suggested to Lord
Brougham that his duty to be a good citizen and promote the wel-
fare of his country required him to "pull his punches," and not as-
sert the right of recrimination against the king.'o Generations of
lawyers who followed after Lord Brougham have pointed to his re-
sponse as the quintessential definition of the appropriate role of a
defense lawyer:
'[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but
one person in all the world, and that person is his client.
To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the de-
struction which he may bring upon others. Separating the
duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on
reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion."'
Today, there are many who argue that Lord Brougham was
guilty of overstating the case. Prominent British barrister David
Pannick, in his highly regarded book, Advocates, suggests that
"[s]uch a conception of the role of the advocate would not now be
widely shared. [An advocate] has important responsibilities to the
court as well as to his client. ' 2 The late Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger, also critical of Lord Brougham's model, rebuked "cynics who
view the lawyer much as the 'hired gun' of the Old West."'3
I do not believe that either Mr. Pannick or Chief Justice Bur-
ger would suggest that Lord Brougham should not have asserted
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 960 n.27.
10. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 3, at 189.
11. Id. (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (London, J. Robins & Co. Albion
Press 1820-21)).
12. DAVID PANNICK, ADVOCATES 105 (1992).
13. In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,731 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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the right of recrimination in Queen Caroline's Case,14 despite the
national confusion it engendered. Nor do I believe any knowl-
edgeable lawyer would suggest that Johnnie Cochran should not
have utilized the evidence of Detective Mark Fuhrman's racism to
challenge his credibility because it would increase racial tensions
in the United States. ' s The critiques of Lord Brougham's bromide
generally focus on his suggestion that saving one's client is the
lawyer's only duty.
Clearly, a lawyer has duties to others as well. A lawyer's du-
ties to the court preclude the knowing presentation of perjured
testimony"6 and the intentional nondisclosure of controlling
authority rejecting a legal position one is arguing.17 A California
lawyer also has substantial duties imposed by the reciprocal dis-
covery law to provide opposing counsel with evidence in advance
of its presentation at trial."8 But do the lawyer's duties to others
include a duty to be a "good citizen" and not assert arguments or
present evidence that will "involve the country in confusion"?
It seems fair to say that the successful defense of O.J. Simpson
has, indeed, "involved our country in confusion." The trial has
been credited with setting back race relations, lowering public es-
teem for the legal profession, diminishing respect for the police,
and destroying public confidence in the criminal justice system. 9
While some of these effects might reasonably have been antici-
pated, should they have been considered and weighed by the law-
yers in assessing what tactical options to pursue? Should lawyers
14. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 3, at 188.
15. As I understand Robert Shapiro's criticism of Cochran for "playing the race
card from the bottom of the deck," it is not a suggestion that Fuhrman's racism
should not have been argued, but rather that it should not have been used to argue
that the credibility of the entire Los Angeles Police Department was at stake. See
ROBERT L. SHAPIRO & LARKIN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 355 (1996).
That is a tactical call I strongly disagree with. I think the evidence at trial supported
a strong inference that the Los Angeles Police Department was covering up and pro-
tecting Fuhrman with full knowledge of his racist tendencies and that Cochran's ar-
gument regarding the credibility of the entire investigation was fully justified. In any
event, I do not understand Shapiro's position to suggest that a lawyer should refrain
from making an argument because it will create racial tension in the community if
such argument is supported by the evidence and the lawyer concludes a jury will find
the argument persuasive.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1994).
17. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-200 (1994).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1996).
19. Cathleen Decker, Faith in Justice System Drops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at
November 1996]
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ever abandon an argument or fail to present evidence that will help
their client because it will hurt their country?
The suggestion that lawyers owe a higher duty to their country
than to their client is inconsistent with our adversary system, al-
though it was quite commonly heard in communist countries that
rejected the adversary system. In such communist systems lawyers
are seen as servants of the state, rather than as advocates for their
clients. The premise of the adversary system is that the goal of fair
adjudication is more likely to be served if lawyers function as zeal-
ous advocates for their clients and leave judgments about what is
good for the "system" for another time and place. Thus, lawyers
who serve their clients are, by definition, serving their country as
well. The duty of lawyers to their clients and their country is the
same: "to represent [the] client zealously within the bounds of the
law."2
0
I would take this position a step beyond simply rejecting the
suggestion that lawyers owe some higher duty to their country. I
would argue that it would be unethical for a lawyer who felt some
higher duty to act upon it to the detriment of the client. Any law-
yer who decides what evidence to offer or what positions to assert
based upon considerations such as, "Will this advance the goal of
racial equality?" or "Will this lessen public confidence in the jus-
tice system?" is cheating the client. In effect, the lawyer has cre-
ated a conflict of interest. The lawyer who has personal objections
to asserting the cause of the client because of a perception that the
cause of the nation is more important has only one choice: to re-
sign.
This is not to say that such considerations are irrelevant to the
client. A lawyer can, and probably should, advise a client that a
particular position or argument may hurt the best interests of the
country. The choice of whether to forego the advantage, however,
must be left to the client. In a criminal case, where the life or lib-
erty of the client is at stake, it will be a rather unusual client who
will say, "I'd rather go to jail-or be gassed or electrocuted-than
imperil the interests of my country."
Thus, calling a good lawyer a bad citizen is internally inconsis-
tent. By being a good lawyer who zealously represents the inter-
ests of a client, the lawyer is being a good citizen who preserves
the tenets of our adversary system of justice.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981).
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Obviously, this is not a proposition that the public under-
stands or applauds. When Lord Brougham referred to the hazards
and costs to oneself that a lawyer may incur, he certainly included
the hazard and cost of public unpopularity. A lawyer who, in pur-
suit of the obligation to zealously represent a client, asserts posi-
tions that are publicly perceived as disturbing to the nation's tran-
quillity will receive the opprobrium of fellow citizens. In the eyes
of the public, it will not be accepted as an excuse or justification
that the lawyer was only doing the job ethically required. That is
simply a risk a lawyer must accept when choosing to represent the
client. The lawyers who represented O.J. Simpson have all been
treated to public castigation with a steady diet of "hate mail" and
personal threats to their safety.21
The real problem is not the role of the lawyer but rather the
public misunderstanding of that role. One of the duties of good
citizens should be to promote public understanding, rather than to
promote public confusion. In that respect, it can truly be said that
George Will is a good columnist, but a bad citizen.
21. See Janet Gilmore, Cochran to Stay Active in Courtroom, for Now, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 29,1995, at A16; Jim Newton et al., Jury Urged to Free Simpson as
Act of Courage, Social Justice, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 29,1995, at Al, A27.
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